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CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYO 
DISPUTES: WEIGHING INTERESTS 
REGARDING GENETIC PARENTHOOD 
CORI SCHREIDER* 
  I. INTRODUCTION 
A woman in her forties is diagnosed with breast cancer.1  Knowing she will 
likely undergo chemotherapy treatment that has the possibility of rendering her 
infertile, she and her husband decide to proceed with in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) 
in order to preserve the option of having a family after her cancer treatment.2 The 
couple signs a consent agreement, which states that in the event of divorce or 
separation, any extra cryopreserved embryos will be discarded.3 The couple 
divorces several years later,4 and the woman, although not infertile because of 
the treatment, has only a 0–5% change of fertility due to her age, and wants to 
use the embryos—a decision her ex-husband opposes.5 The court holds that the 
contract stands, and the embryos are to be discarded, thereby eliminating what is 
perhaps the only opportunity for the woman to ever have a biological child.6 
This case, among many others coming through the state courts in the last 
decade, begs the question of whether one has a right to be or not be a genetic 
parent. One of ten couples in the United States is infertile, and assisted 
reproductive technology (“ART”) has given hundreds of thousands of 
individuals who lack reproductive capacity the opportunity to have genetic 
children.7 Based on 2014 data from the Centers for Disease Control’s National 
ART Surveillance System, there were 208,786 ART cycles performed at 460 
reporting clinics in the United States.8 These cycles resulted in 57,332 live births 
 
© 2017 by Cori Schreider. 
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 1. Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780529, 2016 WL 270083 (Cal. Super. Jan. 11, 2016). 
 2. Id. at 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. NATIONAL ART SURVEILLANCE, CDC (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html.  
 8. ART SUCCESS RATES, CDC (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/index.html. 
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and 70,352 live born infants.9 IVF is the process by which an egg and sperm are 
combined manually, and the embryo is then transferred to the uterus.10  
Often during this process more embryos are created than are needed.11 Dr. 
Richard Scott, for example, who runs a fertility clinic in New Jersey, explained 
that he creates around twelve embryos per couple, implants two to four of those 
embryos, and freezes the rest in the event that the first attempt fails.12 Due to this 
process, he stores up to 7,000 frozen embryos in his clinic at a time.13 Couples 
can also keep embryos in storage not because they have excess embryos after 
implanting a few, but because they want to be proactive in freezing their embryos 
to use some time in the future if they think either party has a chance of becoming 
infertile.14 Freezing embryos gives a 25-50% chance of pregnancy per frozen 
embryo transfer, which makes this option more preferable when compared to a 
woman freezing only her eggs without having them fertilized by sperm.15 
However, cryopreserving these embryos to implant at some time in the future 
can create a variety of complex questions regarding disagreements over their use, 
disposition, or donation.16 
State courts have applied a variety of legal approaches to settle disputes 
about cryopreserved embryos. Part II of this paper will describe and evaluate the 
different methods that courts use to resolve these cases, including the balancing 
test, the contractual approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent 
approach.17 Part III of this paper will evaluate the arguments regarding one’s 
right to be a genetic parent, and conversely one’s right not to be a genetic 
parent.18 Finally, Part IV will propose that in the event of disagreement regarding 
the future of cryopreserved embryos, courts should find in favor of the party 
seeking to avoid procreation, except in circumstances in which either party lacks 
the ability to have a genetic child by other means.19 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. In Vitro Fertilization: IVF, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N (2016), 
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/in-vitro-fertilization/. 
 11. Id. (The number of embryos implanted usually depends on the number of eggs collected and 
maternal age, since the rate of implantation decreases and women age. Thus, doctors will generally create 
more embryos than are needed.).  
 12. Daniel Schorn, A Surplus of Embryos, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 2006), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-surplus-of-embryos/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1 (Findley and Lee decided to freeze their embryos when they found 
out that Lee was diagnosed with breast cancer and would have to undergo chemotherapy treatment that 
could render her infertile). 
 15. Egg & Embryo Freezing, COLUMBIA DOCTORS CENTER FOR WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE CARE, 
http://columbiafertility.org/fertility-services/fertility-preservation/#.VxmKfZMrK8U (last visited Dec. 1, 
2017). 
 16. Meagan R. Marold, Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at the Time of Divorce, 25 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 179, 181 (2014).  
 17. See infra, Part II. 
 18. See infra, Part III. 
 19. See infra, Part IV. 
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II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE FUTURE OF 
CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS  
A. The Balancing Test  
One model that courts have used to decide cases in which there is a 
disagreement between parties over the future of their cryopreserved embryos is 
the balancing test.20  This approach weighs the relative interests of each party in 
using or not using the embryos. Davis v. Davis was the first case of this kind to 
reach a state supreme court.21 The Davises were a couple who had cryopreserved 
embryos after years of unsuccessfully trying to conceive a child via intercourse.22 
When the couple separated, the husband sought to dispose of the embryos, while 
the wife preferred to donate them to another couple in need.23 The court engaged 
in a substantial analysis of Mr. Davis’ testimony, in which he described in detail 
how he was affected by his parents’ divorce, and that he had suffered 
tremendously from the absence of his father in his life.24 He connected this with 
his opposition to embryo donation: that the recipient couple may divorce, leaving 
“his” child in a single-parent setting, which, based only on his own experiences, 
he finds unfavorable.25 
The court held in favor of the husband, ruling that in these situations the 
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.26  While this “obviously,” (to 
the court) outweighs Mrs. Davis’ interest in donation, the court does not clearly 
determine if it would have reached the same outcome if Mrs. Davis wanted the 
embryos for herself.27 The court does signal that the case would be “closer,” but 
only if Mrs. Davis could not achieve parenthood “by any other reasonable 
means.”28 This analysis suggests that in weighing competing interests, the court 
will put the most weight on an individual’s opposition to genetic parenthood.29 
However, even this does not seem to be a blanket rule, as the court still analyzed 
Mr. Davis’ psychological reasoning for opposing the use of the embryos, which 
suggests that his motives were also important to the court’s decision.30 
 
 20. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. 1992); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 21. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen 
Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021 (2004). 
 22. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 
 23. Id. At 589–590. 
 24. Id. At 604. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. At 602. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602. 
 29. Id. at 604 (stating that, while Mrs. Davis’ interests are not insubstantial, “we can only conclude 
that Mary Sue Davis’s interest in donation is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding 
parenthood). 
 30. Id. (discussing Mr. Davis’ history of “problems” caused by separation from his parents).  
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Ultimately, this is a fact-specific approach where the court must delve in to the 
interests and intent of both parties.  
In a more recent decision, Reber v. Reiss, the court engages in the analysis 
that was discussed hypothetically in Davis.31 The wife was diagnosed with breast 
cancer and decided to undergo IVF treatment in order to preserve the wife’s 
ability to conceive a child after chemotherapy.32 When the parties separated, the 
wife sought all of the embryos for implantation.33 The husband opposed, arguing 
that it is against Pennsylvania public policy to force him to procreate with his 
wife.34 Because the wife was now infertile, and created the embryos with her 
impending infertility in mind, the court held that the balancing of the interests 
tipped in her favor.35  
While balancing the relative interests of the parties seems like a rational 
way to deal with the complex problem of frozen embryo disputes, there are 
several drawbacks to this approach. First, it lacks predictability, which could 
result in even more litigation. Because the court fails to set out a determinative 
standard by which it will rule in these disagreements, couples have little incentive 
to think about the future of their cryopreserved embryos when first deciding to 
undergo IVF, and possibly more incentive to bring their disputes to the courts. 
Additionally, the court in Davis made a seemingly subjective determination 
regarding the psychological impact that having a genetic child would have on 
Mr. Davis.36 Another court may not have found the story of his troubled 
childhood so convincing. 
Conversely, this approach is persuasive because it acknowledges the fact 
that decisions regarding relationships and family rearing are deeply personal and 
subject to change.37 By balancing interests at the time when the parties are 
actually making the decision about whether or not to use embryos, they are not 
forcing parties to be bound by decisions they may have made via contract in the 
past.  
B. The Contractual Approach 
In stark contrast to the balancing approach is the contractual approach, in 
which written agreements executed by the parties regarding the disposition of 
their embryos are presumed binding, so long as they are reasonable and 
 
 31. 42 A.3d 1131 (2012). 
 32. Id. at 1133. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 1142. 
 36. Id. (relying on testimony about childhood trauma related to the divorce of his parents and being 
raised by his aunt). 
 37. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (“we recognize that life is not static, and that human emotions 
run particularly high when a married couple is attempting to overcome infertility problems”).  
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unambiguous.38 The advantages to this approach are numerous: efficiency, 
consistency and potentially less likely to result in litigation.39 The contractual 
approach was first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Kass v. 
Kass.40 In this case, the parties signed consent forms before undergoing IVF, 
indicating their mutual agreement to dispose of the embryos in the event that they 
could not agree on whether or not to use them.41 When Mrs. Kass changed her 
mind and requested possession of the embryos so that she could have them 
implanted, Mr. Kass opposed.42 However, the court held that the embryos should 
be destroyed, because the agreement was unambiguous as to the parties’ intent 
and thus binding.43 Despite the fact that one dissenting judge to the opinion found 
that it was more of an informal “informed consent” that failed to provide an 
unambiguous statement of intent, the court relied on the fact that the parties’ 
intent was not only clear, but also mutual, and must be “scrupulously honored.”44 
In another case, J.B. v. M.B., the couple signed a consent form prior to 
undergoing IVF treatment.45  This form, in relevant part, stated that the couple 
agrees that all “control, direction, and ownership of [the] tissues will be 
relinquished to the IVF program under the following circumstances: 1. A 
dissolution of our marriage by court order, unless the court specifies who takes 
control and direction of the tissues. . .”46 The couple divorced, and the man 
sought to donate the embryos to an infertile couple.47 The court held that the 
existence of a valid, unambiguous agreement at the time of the IVF process 
setting out the parties’ intention should guide the decision.48 Citing the Kass 
court, the court pointed out the benefits of enforcing contracts in this context, 
even when weighed against public policy concerns.49  
Jurisdictions that have adopted the contractual approach to embryo disputes 
are placing an emphasis on the ability of competent adults to make advance 
decisions regarding their reproductive abilities,50 while simultaneously failing to 
 
 38. See e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998).  
 39. Noel A. Fleming, Navigating the Slippery Slope of Frozen Embryo Disputes: the Case for a 
Contractual Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 354 (2002). 
 40. Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. 1998). 
 41. Id. at 152. 
 42. Id. at 153. 
 43. Id. at 161. 
 44. Id. at 162. 
 45. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 46. Id. at 710. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 715. 
 49. Id. at 713 (stating that there is even room for reconsideration if there is a disagreement as to the 
disposition of the embryos. In that case, the court says that they can engage in an evaluation of the interests 
of both parties; though, generally, the party wishing not to become a genetic parent will usually prevail). 
 50. Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed State 
Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407 (2013). 
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recognize the uncertainty of what may happen in the future.51 When couples are 
deciding to undergo IVF, they are likely hopeful for their future together and 
with a child, unable to realistically imagine a situation in which their marriage 
fails. Anne Drapkin Lyerly, M.D., a professor of obstetrics and gynecology at 
Duke University Medical Center, summarized these feelings stating that “when 
you’re pouring your money, your heart, and your soul into creating an embryo 
and creating a life, the last thing you want to think about is how you’re going to 
dispose of it.”52  
One study quantified these feelings by surveying 2,210 patients from nine 
geographically diverse fertility clinics across the United States.53 The purpose 
was to asses decisional conflict, which the study defined as “the extent to which 
patients with cryopreserved embryos reported personal uncertainty about 
disposition decisions and related deficits in knowledge and values clarity.”54 The 
results revealed that parties felt “anguished” when presented with the decision of 
what to do with frozen embryos.55 In fact, amongst patients who already 
successfully had a child through IVF, 40% could not even make a decision 
regarding of disposition of their excess embryos.56  The study ultimately revealed 
high rates of decisional conflict, and even more significantly, that “individuals’ 
attitudes about embryos change considerably over time.”57 Similarly, in another 
study coming out of the University of California, researchers found that 72% of 
surveyed couples were undecided about the fate of their stored embryos.58  
Such evidence reveals that contracts and consent forms cannot be relied 
upon for a number of reasons. First, individuals’ attitudes about embryos often 
dramatically change over time, evidenced by the fact that decisional conflict was 
higher for patients who were further along in the course of treatment.59 Lower 
decisional conflict at the time of actually completing the disposition agreement 
compared with higher decisional conflict later in the process reveals the need to 
 
 51. For instance, if one party loses their last chance to become a genetic parent due to the terms of 
the contract. Id. 
 52. Laura Beil, What Happens to Extra Embryos After IVF?, CNN (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/extra.ivf.embryos/. 
 53. A.D. Lyerly, S. Nakagawa, & M. Kuppermann, Decisional conflict and the Disposition of Frozen 
Embryos: Implications for Informed Consent, 26 OXFORD J. 3 (Nov. 2010), 
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/3/646.full.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Beil, supra note 52. 
 59. See Lyerly et al., supra note 53 (stating that patients surveyed varying times throughout the IVF 
process had changing opinions regarding the status of any excess embryos). 
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revisit the discussion about disposition preferences throughout the IVF treatment 
rather than only at the beginning.60  
Courts have also held that upholding such agreements are contrary to public 
policy. In re Marriage of Witten, the court explained that, “to strike down a 
contract on public policy grounds, we must conclude that the preservation of the 
general public welfare. . .outweigh[s] the weighty societal interest in the freedom 
of contract.”61 The Iowa state Supreme Court ultimately found that both case law 
and statutes regarding decisions involving family relationships are emotional 
ones that are subject to change, and therefore it would be against public policy 
to enforce such agreements.62 The court explained that they have generally been 
reluctant to become involved in “intimate questions inherent in personal 
relationships,” and the decisions over embryos in the face of divorce falls under 
that category.63 Thus, while some sort of consent form, and perhaps even 
counseling, should be mandatory simply to set out expectations of the treatment 
for the parties, they should not necessarily be legally binding in the face of a later 
disagreement.  
C. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach 
This model is similar to the contractual approach in the way that, rather than 
balancing the interests of one party against another, it emphasizes the importance 
of both parties making decisions about the future of the cryopreserved embryos 
together.64 However, unlike the contractual approach, it also addresses the 
difficulty of being able to predict what may happen in the future, prior to 
undergoing IVF.65 Under this theory, both parties must agree to all decisions as 
to the disposition, donation, or implantation of embryos at the actual time when 
they are making the decision to implant, donate or discard excess embryos, rather 
than only before beginning IVF treatment in the first place. Otherwise, the 
embryos will simply remain frozen until a decision is reached.66  
In A.Z. v. B.Z., for example, a married couple conceived a child through 
IVF, and the remaining embryos from the process were frozen for potential future 
use.67 The parties separated several years later, and the husband filed a motion to 
 
 60. Id. (revealing that higher decisional conflict among patients not intending to become pregnant 
highlights the need to discuss disposition preferences throughout the process rather than only before the 
process begins). 
 61. In re the Marriage of Arthur Lee Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa, 2003). 
 62. Id. For example, Iowa law imposes a seventy-two hour waiting period after the birth of a child 
before the biological parents may release parental rights. Iowa Code § 600A.4(2)(g) (July 1, 2013). 
 63. In re the Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781. 
 64. See, e.g., Melissa Boatman, Bringing up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable Framework 
for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes after Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 292 (2008). 
 65. Id. at 293. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (2000). 
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obtain an injunction against the wife from using the remaining embryos.68 
Despite the existence of several consent forms signed at the time of the IVF 
process, the court held that they refused to enforce any such agreement that 
would compel one party to become a parent against his or her will.69 The court 
describes this as “forced procreation,” which would violate public policy and is 
therefore “not amendable to judicial enforcement.”70 In In re the Marriage of 
Witten, the court similarly held that the embryos could not be disposed of unless 
they reach an agreement.71 While the court did hold that disposition agreements 
generally do not violate public policy, in the event that there is a change of heart 
by one party, the emotional nature of these decisions is such that the agreement 
can no longer be upheld.72 
This approach emphatically prioritizes the right not to procreate over the 
right to do so, and fails to address the possibility of there being any situation to 
the contrary. A significant amount of time could pass before reaching a decision, 
which is of much inconvenience to a party seeking to have a child. There are also 
downsides for the party seeking to avoid procreation. An individual who would 
prefer the embryos be disposed or donated must continue to pay the costs of 
storage while the parties work towards a decision, which can be as high as $40 a 
month or even up to $600 a year.73 Ultimately, though, it seems unlikely that the 
party wishing to procreate will consistently prevail when this approach is used. 
The problem with this approach is best summarized by a footnote in Reber v. 
Reiss: “. . .If the parties could reach an agreement, they would not be in court.”74 
Despite the pitfalls of each of these three approaches, no court has yet to 
come up with an alternative way to resolve frozen embryo disputes. Several 
states have enacted legislation to try to help the problem. For example, Louisiana 
classifies embryos as human beings and prohibits their destruction altogether.75 
New Hampshire and Florida both require a prior agreement for IVF participants, 
and NH additionally requires judicial preauthorization, as well as counseling 
prior to undergoing IVF.76 New York and New Jersey have each considered bills 
that have not yet passed requiring disposition agreements that must set forth the 
parties’ wishes for the embryos in the event of death, divorce, or other changed 
circumstances.77 Requiring agreements; however, still fails to address what will 
 
 68. Id. at 1053. 
 69. Id. at 1060. 
 70. Id. 
 71. In re the Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 162. 
 74. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (2012) (further stating that “this approach strikes us as being totally 
unrealistic.”). 
 75. Kellie LaGatta, The Frozen Embryo Debate Heats Up: A Call for Federal Regulation and 
Legislation, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 99, 108 (2002) 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
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happen if there is a disagreement sometime in the future over the agreement’s 
terms. Thus, this current legislation and the failure of the courts to come up with 
a different solution leaves open the need for a more predictable way to settle 
these types of agreements. 
III. THE RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE VERSUS THE RIGHT TO BE A GENETIC 
PARENT 
In any dispute over cryopreserved embryos, the court must engage in some 
form of analysis in which it considers the importance of one party’s interest in 
not becoming a genetic parent and the other party’s interest in becoming one. 
This is the most obvious in the balancing approach, but also is apparent in the 
others.78 For instance, the contractual approach generally prioritizes an 
individual’s interest in not procreating, as most consent forms set out that 
embryos will be disposed of or turned over to the fertility clinic in the event of 
separation or divorce, and the court states that it is essential to uphold any 
contract that is legal and unambiguous.79 In the contemporaneous mutual consent 
approach, the court is even more clearly emphasizing the importance of a right 
not to become a genetic parent, as one party’s interest in procreating will under 
no circumstances be allowed if the other party objects.80 I argue that while the 
right to not become a genetic parent generally should enjoy this prioritization, 
there are situations in which the right to be a genetic parent trumps.81  
A. The Right to Be a Genetic Parent 
An individual opposing procreation would likely argue that even in a case 
where the party seeking procreation cannot reasonably have a child by other 
means, he or she still does not have any right to be a genetic parent. Radhika Rao 
argues that while Skinner v. Oklahoma created a fundamental right to 
procreation, this negative right to be free from state interference does not call for 
“an affirmative obligation to assure the exercise of procreative choice by placing 
its prestige and power behind the enforcement of preconception contracts.”82 
Following this analysis, when parties have decided to sign preconception 
contracts, the state cannot ensure that these agreements will be enforced all the 
way through. An individual has the right to resist compulsory sterilization, 
contraception, or abortion, but this right does not extend to an affirmative right 
to use assistive reproductive technology.83 Furthermore, disputes arising out of 
pre-embryo disposition agreements are between private parties – not state actors 
 
 78. See supra, Part II.A. 
 79. See supra, Part II.B. 
 80. See supra, Part II.C. 
 81. See infra, Part IV. 
 82. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1484 (May, 1995). 
 83. Id. at 1485. 
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– and thus it can be argued that it does not raise a constitutional issue that would 
be governed by Skinner or other cases citing the fundamental right to 
procreation.84 
While these reasons may be compelling, and there likely is no constitutional 
right to be a genetic parent in this context, there are still numerous policy-based 
reasons as to why an individual who wants to have a biological child has the right 
to have one, including 1. The personal decision made by many choosing to 
undergo IVF, 2. Difficulties with the adoption process, and 3. Cultural and social 
significance placed on genetics. 
1. Making the Choice to Undergo IVF 
Many couples choose to undergo IVF over adoption. IVF is a long, grueling 
and emotional process, which shows the importance that both a man and a 
woman place on having a child that is composed of both of their genetic 
material.85 A doctor at the Center for Reproductive Medicine and Infertility at 
the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center described IVF as a “horrible 
process,” and that “people don’t understand how horrible a disease infertility 
is.”86 One woman who described her process with IVF in a New York Times 
article said that she “had to get up at 5 every morning. . .you don’t feel so great. 
Your ovaries are swelling up. You’re cranky, tired, you have mood swings, 
you’re tense. And you want that baby.”87  
The Findley v. Lee holding seemed to ignore this aspect of the IVF 
process.88 The court suggested that because Lee knew that her marriage was 
failing, she could have taken steps to preserve additional eggs, knowing that the 
embryos she created with her husband would be destroyed if they did in fact 
divorce.89 In addition to the problems inherent with the court assuming that Lee 
knew her marriage was failing, it also seems improper for the court to impose 
the burden on Lee to have her eggs extracted once again, given the physically 
and emotionally draining process of doing so.90  
Furthermore, a couple’s reasoning for deciding to go through IVF, rather 
than deciding to not have a child, or to adopt, is a deeply personal one. One 
mother described her main reason for undergoing IVF as “a compelling, 
persistent desire to create a life, to bear and raise a child knowing that the one 
 
 84. I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1171 
(Feb. 2008). 
 85. Since there are other avenues – like artificial insemination, adoption etc. See id.  
 86. Barbara Stewart, Tough Choices: In Vitro vs. Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/08/nyregion/tough-choices-in-vitro-vs-
adoption.html?pagewanted=all. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Findley, supra note 1. 
 89. Id.at 34. 
 90. Id. at 37. 
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reason he exists is because our love brought him into being.”91 She goes on to 
explain that this is the same drive felt by couples or individuals who decide to 
and eventually successfully adopt children, and the same as a couple who can 
conceive children in any other matter.92 Though not quantifiable or rooted in law, 
such a deep-seeded desire is compelling in allowing a party to have possession 
of their embryos when that is their only chance of having a genetic child. 
2. Difficulties With the Adoption Process 
Additionally, there are reasons that lend support to the right to have a 
genetic child that are not purely emotional in nature. While IVF is a long, 
expensive process, adoption can sometimes be even longer and costlier. For 
instance, for younger women, there is a high chance of achieving success through 
IVF within three cycles, which can collectively be less expensive than 
adoption.93 One single mother said she did not meet the financial threshold to get 
approval for adoption.94 Adoption can also be a timely process, taking years to 
bring a child home.95 Furthermore, there are possible barriers to adoption 
depending on marital and socioeconomic status.96 For instance, public adoption 
agencies will often give a child to a married couple first and a single person as a 
secondary option.97 According to the National Committee for Adoption, for 
every child put up for adoption, there are as many as 50-100 infertile couples 
looking to adopt.98 Oftentimes, birth mothers who are a part of the process of 
seeking a family for their child will express an interest for their child to be 
adopted by a married couple, thereby disadvantaging single people.99  
Private agencies are also available, but those too may have their own 
requirements as to age, marital status and income, sometimes even preferring 
particular religions.100 Thus, while IVF is difficult both physically and 
emotionally, adoption, too, can be a long, emotional process. Therefore, the 
availability of adoption does not necessarily make it a substitute for IVF; rather, 
another alternative that is right for some couples, but should not be compelled 
upon others when faced with infertility.  
 
 91. Julie Robichaux, IVF Versus Adoption: Why ‘Just Adopt’ Is Not the Answer, TODAY SHOW (Dec. 
7, 2010), http://www.today.com/parents/ivf-versus-adoption-why-just-adopt-not-answer-1C7398701. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Kelly Wallace, Infertility: When Adoption is Not an Option, CNN (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/living/feat-infertility-when-adoption-not-option/. 
 95. Waldman, supra note 21 at 1056. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1055. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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3. Cultural, Historical and Social Reasons for Wanting Biological Children 
Couples may also want a genetic child for cultural or historical reasons. 
Parents may want their child to share a common ancestry with them, if that 
ancestry is of cultural significance, or where physical traits are essential to 
cultural identity.101 One example of a link between genetic traits and cultural 
identity occurs in the deaf community, one commentator observing that 
“. . .perhaps the parents feel that deafness. . .is an asset—tough at times but 
worthwhile in the end—like belonging to a racial or religious minority.”102 In 
most cultures, the idea of a “blood bond” between parent and child is at least 
somewhat significant historically, and therefore it is natural to want a child in 
this way.103 While there is a compelling argument against genetic 
determinism,104 genes still have a social significance, which in turn causes 
individuals to put a high value on genetic traits.105 Ultimately, individuals 
seeking to use frozen embryos to conceive a child would argue that these 
emotional, social, economic and historical reasons are compelling for them to get 
to have a genetic child over an opposing party under any circumstances.  
B.  The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent  
However, there is also a strong public policy argument that there is a right 
not to procreate, meaning that both men and women have an interest in not 
having their genetic material used to conceive a child against their will. I, along 
with many of the courts, believe that as a general rule, this interest is the most 
compelling. This is because: 1. There is right against having one’s genetic 
material used without their consent; 2. The potential for coercion into having a 
social relationship with the child; and, 3. That an emphasis on the importance of 
genetics supports the idea of genetic essentialism.  
1. Using One’s Genetic Material Without Their Consent  
An individual who does not consent to having a genetic child should 
generally not be compelled into parenthood. More specifically, a man, for 
example, has an argument that his sperm cells are his personal property and may 
not be taken to create a child when he is opposed to having one. However, sperm 
has not been classified fully as property. In Hecht v. The Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, the appellate court cited to Davis, stating that sperm should be 
categorized as an intermediate position somewhere between property and 
 
 101. Fred Norton, Assisted Reproduction and the Frustration of Genetic Affinity: Interest, Injury and 
Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801 (June 1999). 
 102. Id. at 804. 
 103. John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis 
for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (May 1991).  
 104. See infra, Part III.B.3. 
 105. See Findley, supra note 1. 
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persons.106 The Hecht court was referring to the analysis in Davis whereby the 
Court refused to characterize pre-embryos as “persons,” but also refused to 
characterize the Davis’ interests as a property interest under property law.107 The 
Davis court engaged in an analysis based on a report of the Ethics Committee of 
the American Fertility Society, identifying three possible positions to classify the 
status of an embryo: 1. That a pre-embryo is a human subject after fertilization; 
2. A pre-embryo has a status no different from any other human tissue; and 3. 
adopted by Davis, that a pre-embryo is somewhere between numbers one and 
two.108  
In Hecht, Mr. Kane stored 15 vials of sperm in a storage bank, and not long 
after, took his own life.109 There was existing evidence that indicated that Mr. 
Kane intended his girlfriend, Ms. Hecht, to have his children with the sperm.110 
However, when Ms. Hecht attempted to claim the sperm from the sperm bank, 
the bank refused, and both the executor of Mr. Kane’s estate and Mr. Kane’s 
children submitted petitions to have the sperm destroyed.111 The court analyzed 
that due to the status of the sperm as not quite a person, but not exactly property 
because of its potential for human life, they should be offered a particular 
respect.112 Mr. Kane’s interest in the embryos were limited to “an ownership 
interest to the extent that he has decision making authority over the disposition 
of the sperm.”113 Thus, it is not a true property interest, but an interest limited to 
one of decision-making authority.114 Therefore, Mr. Kane’s intent for the sperm 
to be given to Ms. Hecht was to be adhered to.115 Had the sperm been a true 
property interest, they would not have been awarded to Ms. Hecht, but rather 
made assets of Mr. Kane’s estate.116 
Some scholars have criticized the Hecht ruling, stating that failing to 
recognize sperm in terms of property rights will lead to inconsistent results and 
less predictability from state to state.117 While sperm, alone, leans more towards 
property than personhood, when it comes to frozen embryos, these are even less 
 
 106. 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849 (Cal. App. Div. 1883). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 840. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. (Mr. Hecht’s will stated “I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any 
specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen 
Hecht”). 
 111. Id. at 842. 
 112. Id. at 848. 
 113. Id. at 849. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 851.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Ernest Weintraub, Are Sperm Cells a Form of Property? A Biological Inquiry into the Legal 
Status of the Sperm Cell, 11 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 1, 9 (2007) (stating that a failure to classify sperm 
as property will yield unpredictable results across states).  
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like a piece of property, considering the even greater potential for life when a 
sperm cell is already joined with an egg during the IVF process.118 What the 
Hecht and Davis analyses do lend support to is the fact that the intent of the 
individual who uses their genetic material has an interest in its future.  
It may be argued that there are similar situations whereby an individual’s 
interest in their own genetic material does not always give them decision-making 
priority. For example, it is established not only that a woman has the right to have 
an abortion over the objection of the other party, but also that a woman has a 
right to have a child over an objection from the genetic child who would prefer 
she get an abortion.119 This could create a situation in which a woman has a child, 
created with the sperm from a man who fully opposes having a biological child. 
Thus, a woman who wants to implant a frozen embryo without the consent of the 
man may argue that these situations are analogous: if a woman can have a child 
without the consent of her husband when it is already implanted, she can also 
have a child without the consent of her husband when it is not yet implanted. 
Arguably, engaging in the IVF process is beginning the biological process of 
having a child, and stopping it in his tracks is no different than compelling 
abortion.120 Furthermore, while individuals may engage in intercourse without 
the intention of creating a child, individuals who decide to undergo IVF are doing 
so for the explicit purpose of eventually having a child, and therefore there is an 
even greater interest in bringing that intention to fruition.  
However, this argument is flawed for several reasons. The abortion cases 
imply a right to be a gestational parent; they do not establish a right to be a 
genetic parent.121 This is because the arguments in favor of a woman’s right to 
an abortion absent the consent of the potential father are grounded in bodily 
integrity.122 Along these lines, compelling abortion is different than compelling 
the disposal of pre-embryos. For instance, I. Glenn Cohen makes the analogy 
that while it could infringe on one’s bodily integrity to force a tube down one’s 
throat to stomach pump up pills as incriminating evidence, the same concern is 
not evident when a detective examines saliva on pills an individual has 
 
 118. IVF success rates have increased over time, while pregnancy rates for Intrauterine Insemination 
Procedures have not. See In Vitro Fertilization, IVF – Advantages Compared to Other Fertility Treatments 
such as Artificial Insemination, ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. CHI. (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfchanges.htm. 
 119. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. (1976) (holding that that State 
does not have the constitutional authority to give one spouse the ability to unilaterally prohibit the wife 
from terminating her pregnancy); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that 
requiring spousal notification before obtaining an abortion placed an undue burden on the mother). 
 120. Ashley Marcin, Embryo v. Fetus: Fetal Development Week by Week, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 14, 
2016), http://www.healthline.com/health/pregnancy/embryo-fetus-development (describing the 
differences between an embryo and a fetus, calling embryo formation the “baby’s basic foundation and 
framework,” and the fetus as “growth and development.”). 
 121. Cohen, supra note 84. 
 122. Id. 
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regurgitated without force.123 When the “integrity” is broken because biological 
material is no longer attached to the body, there is no longer quite the same 
justification for avoiding bodily invasion.124 Thus, a biological father’s interest 
in not having a child when an embryo is created is not halted by a woman’s 
bodily integrity as it would be if a biological father’s interest was in aborting an 
already conceived fetus. Therefore, the holding in Hecht, where Mr. Kane’s 
intent regarding the future of his sperm was adhered to, should be followed when 
one party does not intend to have their genetic material used to create a human 
life.125  
2. Forced Social Relationships 
A second argument for the right not to be a genetic parent are the 
psychological implications once the child is born.126 There are varying degrees 
of relationships that a parent may have with a child: a genetic/biological 
relationship, a legal relationship and a social relationship.127 Derek Ettinger 
describes the difference between genetic and social parenthood.128 He explains 
that a genetic relationship does not guarantee any sort of normative relationship 
between parent and child; and conversely, a genetic connection is not necessary 
for the norms of social parenthood to exist.129 Rather, social parenthood is 
defined through intentions, actions, and emotional and conceptual bonds.130 Take 
adoption, for example. It is clearly the expectation that parents of adopted 
children fulfil the same obligations as would any biological parent.131 On the 
other side of the coin are sperm donors: individuals who technically are 
biological parents, but are not expected to be social parents.132 One study 
revealed that, of surveyed sperm donors, 80% would not want to be informed of 
pregnancies that resulted from their donation, 88% would not be interested in 
meeting their resulting offspring, and 60% stated they would not go forward with 
 
 123. Id. at 1157. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Findley, supra note 1. 
 126. See, e.g., id. (where Findley argues that he was disturbed by Lee’s discussion of the future of his 
potential child).  
 127. See, e.g., Derek J. Ettinger, Genes, Gestation, and Social Norms, 31 L. PHILOSOPHY 243 (May 
2012). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Tim Bayne, Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility, 20 J. OF APPLIED 
PHILOSOPHY 1 (2003) (rejecting the argument that gamete donors have parental responsibilities that they 
“treat too lightly). 
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the donation if they knew their offspring could find their identity later in life.133 
This lends support to an argument that parental attachment is not biologically 
rooted, or else more sperm donors would seek out the identity of their genetic 
children.134  
Yet, there is a clear and obvious difference between male IVF participants 
and sperm donors, in that the party opposed to having a child is not anonymous. 
Sperm donors generally do not have knowledge of where their genetic material 
is going, while the men in many of the aforementioned cases may have 
complicated relationships with the women who may gestate and parent their 
biological child.135 Additionally, unlike sperm donors, most IVF participants 
engage in the process with the expectation that they are to become legal, genetic 
and social parents as a result.136 Furthermore, these participants are either 
married or in some type of relationship at the time of IVF, and thus will always 
have some sort of connection, even after separation. In Findley v. Lee, for 
example, the woman looking to implant the cryopreserved embryos mentioned 
that she would speak ill of the child’s father and his decision to not be a part of 
the child’s life.137 This not only has the potential to psychologically impact the 
genetic father, but also the child, who may feel neglected or unwanted.138  
There may be an additional argument that legal and social implications do 
not have to be an issue if the party seeking to implant the embryos allows the 
other party to opt out, via contract, of legal, parental roles. This would include 
the general parental obligations that exist after divorce or separation, like custody 
and child support. While this would help to safeguard the opposing party, there 
is ultimately no guarantee that the psychological impact would be any less.  Thus, 
the court’s decision regarding the future of cryopreserved embryos should 
generally weigh in favor of the party seeking to avoid procreation.  
3. The Case Against Genetic Essentialism 
The final argument for the right not to be a genetic parent directly addresses 
the argument in Part II.A by stating that there is no compelling reason to have a 
genetic child. Genetic essentialism is the idea that our genes are the most 
important part of who we are as individuals, ignoring the way that “our cells and 
environments interrelate, the ways our physiological system functions as a whole 
 
 133. Bjorn Pedersen et al., Psychosocial Aspects of Donor Insemination: Sperm Donors—Their 
Motivations and Attitudes to Artificial Insemination, 73 ACTA. OBSTET. GYNECOL. SCAND. 701, 702 
(1994). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Waldman, supra note 21 at 1048. 
 136. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1 (Findley and Lee were married when deciding to undergo IVF). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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organism, and the ways our minds and hearts affect our being.139 Though 
deviating slightly from the main premise of this paper, the argument against 
genetic essentialism can be well explained through the unfortunate situation 
where there is a mix-up during the course of using ART.140 In Perry-Rogers v. 
Fasano, one couple’s embryos (Perry-Rogers’) were implanted in the wrong 
woman (Fasano).141 While Fasano agreed to turn the baby over to his genetic 
parents, she sought visitation rights, which the genetic parents originally 
consented to in an agreement, but then subsequently denied.142 When Fasano 
sought to enforce the visitation agreement, the court held that she did not have 
standing to dispute visitation of the child.143  
By ruling in a purely procedural manner, the court failed to listen to any 
claims about the best interests of the child, the child’s relationship with the 
Fasano’s, or the role of the ART mistake in causing this dilemma in the first 
place.144 The court essentially blames Fasano for forming a bond with this child 
when she knew it was not genetically related, as evidenced by their different 
races.145 Though not an easy, nor common, situation to resolve, this ruling is 
problematic because it undermines the ability for a parent to form a bond with 
her non-biological child.146 While the court acknowledges that a bond between a 
gestational carrier and fetus is often formed while in utero, it fails to rule with 
that idea in mind.147 Thus, the court impliedly ruled under a genetic essentialism 
framework. 
This is problematic for a number of reasons. While genetic information is 
useful scientifically; i.e. in predicting and treating illnesses, what constitutes a 
family is arguably not scientific at all.148 Genetics fails to address the role of 
pregnancy and birth, as shown in the Fasano case, as well as the role of nurture 
after birth.149 Furthermore, reducing individuals to their DNA can trap them into 
feeling as though they have to act a certain way, which can stifle individuals in 
reaching their full potential.150 While there is a history of tying biological 
 
 139. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, 
Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2003).  
 140. Id. at 2. 
 141. 276 A.D.2d 67 (App. Div. 2000). 
 142. Id. at 68. 
 143. Id. at 74. 
 144. Weintraub, supra note 117. 
 145. Id. (claiming that this case was solved simply by way of “race-matching” to determine parental 
rights). 
 146. Bender, supra note 139 at 7.  
 147. Id. at 27. 
 148. Id. at 76 (arguing that there are not technical or scientific answers to complex human, familial 
problems).  
 149. Id. at 3 (stating that genetic essentialism “renders all our ways of nurturing and being nurtured 
by one another for naught”). 
 150. Id. at 42. 
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reproduction with parental responsibility, the evolving definition of a family has 
made this connection weaker.151 For instance, some states have begun to modify 
the application of “traditional” parental preference when it comes to custody 
disputes, such as by awarding custody of a child to a non-biological parent who 
has performed all functions of a primary caregiver, even when it is against the 
wishes of the legal caregiver.152 The fact that the courts are willing to progress 
along with society shows that genetic parenthood is not necessarily prioritized 
over other factors, such as intent and actions. 
It may be argued that, as discussed in Part III A, a decision to have a 
biological child is not based on scientific or even rational reasoning for wanting 
a biological child; but rather, is purely emotional.153 A desire for a genetic child 
may be simply based on a gut-feeling that having a child through the IVF process 
is what is right for them, and they have a right to see that through.154 Furthermore, 
there is often cultural and social significance associated with passing along 
genetics.155 Without trying to undermine the validity of an individual’s emotions, 
this feeling is still likely, at least in part, encouraged by societal “norms”—that 
it is more accepted, or more desirable, to have a biological child, only because 
more families have biological children than non-biological children.156 Even 
Fred Norton, who argues in favor of genetic affinity, admits that it is partially 
due to the “normative” experience of constructing a family unit that shares 
identifiable traits is what makes it more appealing for many.157 Norton also 
concedes that interest in genetic affinity is not functional, but rather purely 
subjective and aesthetic; meaning, the role of genetics in personal identity is less 
determinative, and therefore parental interest in affinity is more so related to their 
children having symbolic, common traits.158 Therefore, while a parent’s desire 
for a biological child should not be questioned, the reasoning behind the desire 
may not be compelling enough to outweigh an opposing party’s desire to not 
have a genetic child. 
 
 151. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions between Legal, Biological and 
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 133 (2006) (though changes in parentage laws 
have not changed fundamentally, some courts and legislatures have made attempts to “bend” traditional 
doctrines to account for non-traditional parents). 
 152. Id. (describing a situation in which a lesbian couple had shared parenting responsibility equally. 
When the couple separated, the court refused to give preference to the woman who had actually given 
birth to the child, and treated both women equally). 
 153. See supra, Part III.A.  
 154. See supra, Part III.A.  
 155. See Findley, supra note 1. 
 156. In 2009, U.S. citizens adopted around 13,000 children from 106 different countries. OFF AND 
RUNNING: FACT SHEET, MD. PUB. TELEVISION (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/pov/offandrunning/fact-sheet/.  
 157. See Norton, supra note 101. 
 158. Id. 
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IV. GIVING PRIORITY TO GENETIC REPRODUCTION IN CASES OF LIMITED 
REPRODUCTIVE CAPACITY 
While courts have engaged in balancing tests, sometimes placing weight on 
the desire of the mother to procreate due to a lack of alternative means of 
procreation, no court has forthrightly stated that when a woman or man cannot 
have a biological child by other means, they should always get possession of the 
embryos when there is a dispute. This resolution is most appropriate for a variety 
of reasons: First, it emphasizes the importance of genetic parenthood for both the 
party wanting to procreate and the party seeking to avoid procreation. Second, it 
creates predictability in these decisions, which can in turn decrease the amount 
of litigation, and in most instances, also give the parties sufficient notice as to 
the outcome of any future dispute, based on knowledge of their own reproductive 
capabilities.159 
A. The Right to Procreate and the Right Not to Procreate 
Arguments for the right not to have a genetic child and the right to have a 
genetic child are both properly addressed within this framework. As discussed in 
Part III, genetic parenthood clearly holds importance in our society.160 This can 
support both the argument as to why individuals seeking to avoid genetic 
parenthood may feel so strongly about it; and, conversely, why those who wish 
to implant the embryos also feel strongly about being able to do so. Allowing 
disposal of embryos unless one party cannot have a genetic child by alternative 
means somewhat addresses the interests of both sides. If the embryos are 
disposed of, the party opposed to a genetic child will not have one, while the 
other party, if they have reproductive capacity, can still go through the IVF cycle 
with another partner or by using a sperm donor or an egg donor. This is not to 
downplay the difficult and emotional process of IVF, especially for a woman; 
however, as exemplified from the courts engaging in the balancing test, the party 
avoiding a genetic child should generally prevail, and in the end, both parties can 
eventually get what they want.161 
However, the importance of a genetic child also lends support to an 
individual wishing to have a genetic child when it is his or her only opportunity 
to do so. Perhaps a woman has had cancer, and the chemotherapy rendered her 
infertile.162 Or, she has undergone a hysterectomy and cannot carry a child on 
her own. And, perhaps the embryos she created through IVF with her then-
 
 159. Of course, reproductive capabilities are subject to change even after undergoing IVF, but in many 
instances a couple is deciding to go through the IVF process because either party knows they are at risk 
of becoming infertile due to illness, age constraints, etc. 
 160. See supra, Part III. 
 161. See generally, supra, Part I.A. 
 162. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1. 
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husband or partner was her last chance of producing eggs.163 It is only in this 
situation that importance of having a genetic child outweighs opposition from 
the other party. Furthermore, in this situation, under this potential solution, the 
party seeking to avoid procreation would have no social or legal obligations to 
the child. They would not be obligated to pay child support, have any sort of 
custody, or any social role in the child’s life. As discussed in Part II, it may be 
argued that this plan is not as full-proof as it may seem, as there are additional 
psychological implications for the opposing party that cannot be “waived.”164 
However, hopefully with these safeguards in place, the opposing party would not 
feel as compelled to develop a social relationship as he/she otherwise would.  
The court in Szafranski v. Dunston lays out the argument for priority in a 
limited reproductive context.165 Although the court is engaging in a balancing 
test, the analysis exemplifies why such cases should always come to this 
resolution.166 In that case, Karla was diagnosed with lymphoma and expected to 
be infertile as a result from the chemotherapy.167 She underwent IVF with her 
boyfriend, Jacob, and created and froze three viable embryos.168  The couple 
signed a consent form stating that, in the event of divorce or dissolution of the 
marriage or partnership, and disagreement regarding the embryos, the couple 
would donate the embryos to another couple.169 Their relationship ended; Jacob 
wanted the embryos discarded, Karla wanted to use them.170 The court refused 
to make a judicial determination that alternative methods of parenthood, like 
adoption, offer an acceptable substitution to genetic parenthood, and ultimately 
concluded that while Jacob’s interest in not being a biological parent should not 
be undermined, Karla’s interests, given her ovarian failure, must prevail.171  
B. An Interest in Predictability and Efficiency 
Despite the Szafranski court reaching the right outcome, the way in which 
it proceeded is problematic. The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the 
couples’ intent, the informed consent agreement, their oral agreement, and 
Jacob’s reasoning for not wanting a child, including his fear that having a 
biological child would prohibit him from finding love in the future.172 In Findley, 
the court engaged in a similar analysis, and yet came to the completely opposite 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra, Part II. 
 165. 34 N.E.3d 1132 (2015). 
 166. Id. at 1136. 
 167. Id. 
 168. They were in a relationship at the time, though both acknowledged that they doubted their 
relationship would be long term. Id. at 1138. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1145. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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conclusion.173 This lack of consistency will not encourage couples to thoroughly 
think through these types of situations before deciding to undergo IVF. Rather, 
an individual may feel more comfortable making a spur-of-the-moment decision 
to help his or her partner create a child, knowing that later on, if they want to 
dispute the agreement, they can do so and get out of being a parent. Conversely, 
having more stringent guidelines in place as to how disputes will be resolved will 
force couples to think through these possibilities ahead of time.  
Additionally, the Szafranski case took four years of litigation to reach a 
final verdict.174 Pregnancy is a time-sensitive matter, and when one’s ability to 
procreate is on the line, waiting for years for a court to subjectively decide on the 
fate of one’s potential child through use of the balancing test is unreasonable. 
Creating a more predictable ruling will help remedy this problem. First, couples 
deciding to have IVF treatment will usually have notice if either party is infertile 
or likely to become infertile. For instance, in both Szafranski and Findley, the 
parties wanted to preserve embryos in the event that the cancer treatment took 
away the women’s reproductive capacities.175 Thus, at this point, the men would 
be aware that if they were to opposed to the implantation of the embryos at some 
point in the future, the women would get to use the embryos if they so desired. 
This will not always be the case, as a couple could preserve embryos for a variety 
of reasons, and only later does one party become infertile; however, the outcome 
would have to be the same. The reverse could also happen, where a woman 
believes she will be infertile and then is found to be capable of producing eggs, 
but again, this would not change the application of the rule—if the woman is 
fertile, and the man opposes to her having his child, she will not be able to do so. 
This predictability will allow couples to make more thoughtful decisions at 
the time the embryos are created and cryopreserved, and therefore less likely to 
litigate, knowing what the outcome will be. In the event that there is litigation, 
higher state courts will be less likely to hear appeals of these cases, as long as 
the lower courts follow the rule. The one aspect of this solution lacking in 
predictability is in defining infertility. Ultimately, this burden would fall onto the 
court to make a determination regarding at what point a woman or man is 
rendered “infertile,” since with age-related infertility, and especially with men 
this may not be so certain.176 While infertility may be more determinative when 
caused by illness, it can be less so when it is age-related. According to the World 
Health Organization, infertility is defined as “the failure to achieve a clinical 
 
 173. See Findley, supra note 1. 
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 175. See Findley, supra note 1. 
 176. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1. (A fertility doctor determined that due to Lee’s age, her chances 
of successfully conceiving a child were 0-5%). 
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pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular protected sexual intercourse.”177 
Yet, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine includes in its definition 
that for women aged 35 and older, inability to conceive after six months is 
generally considered infertility.178 However, neither of these definitions can be 
sufficient when determining infertility when deciding the disposition of embryos 
after divorce, since waiting that time period is unreasonable, nor would either 
party have a sexual partner after divorce. Thus, infertility would need to be 
determined by medical experts, and may not come down to a conclusive result  
However, this one determination is still undoubtedly less complex than 
engaging in an analysis of the parties’ reasons for and against having biological 
children. Thus, an emphasis on efficiency, while also considering the interests of 
the parties by understanding their reproductive abilities, strikes a balance 
between the contractual approach and the balancing test. It may be argued that if 
efficiency and predictability are the goals, then the contractual approach should 
be the answer. However, as previously discussed, this approach undermines the 
emotionally fluid process of deciding to go through IVF.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Decisions to start a family, especially when faced with reproductive 
obstacles, is a deeply personal one. The assistance of ART is tremendously useful 
to infertile individuals who want nothing more than to have a biological child. 
However, uncertainty regarding the future of relationships and personal health 
can bring about many problems between individuals who have frozen their 
embryos to be used sometime in the future. Though ART has been around for 
two decades, this is still fairly new technology and consequently, the courts have 
been faced with new dilemmas surrounding its use in the past several years.179 
Most jurisdictions have stuck to one of three frameworks for determining embryo 
disputes: the balancing test, the contractual approach, and the contemporaneous 
mutual consent approach.180 However, in order to properly address the interests 
of all parties, the courts should adopt a more predictive and efficient standard. 
Implementing a rule that the opposing party prevails, with an exception in the 
case where one of the parties has no other means to have a biological child, 
properly gives weight to both parties’ while also ensuring more thoughtfulness 
in the parties’ decision-making and greater efficiency in the court system. 
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